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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
Article 15(b)(4) of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (“IST”) Statute provides that an individual
who in any way contributes to the commission of a crime within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction can
be held criminally responsible and liable for punishment, even if he does not perpetrate the crime
himself. 1 A form of this “common purpose” liability has been fashioned into a substantial
amount of “joint criminal enterprise” (“JCE”) jurisprudence at the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(“ICTR”), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”). Part III of this memorandum will
explore the evolution of JCE, how the international tribunals have shaped the theory, and the
evidentiary requirements of the doctrine. Part IV of this memo will examine how Article
15(b)(4) of the IST differs from the relevant provisions of its counterparts, how these differences
may affect the use of JCE at the IST, and whether the new “common purpose” wording might
open the door for prosecutors to charge conspiracy under this provision. Part V will then address
how a prosecutor might apply the facts from two series of events in Iraq to charge particular
defendants before the Court under Article 15(b)(4).
Summary of Conclusions
1. Article 15(b)(4) of the IST Statute encompasses Joint Criminal Enterprise.
The ICTY, ICTR and SCSL have established that individuals can be held criminally
responsible for participating with others who have a “common purpose” to commit a crime that
falls within the tribunals’ jurisdiction.

Case law from these courts reveals that “common

1

Liability arises if the individual “[i]n any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of
such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall
either: (i.) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose
involves the voluntary commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; or (ii.) Be made in the
knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.” The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal [hereinafter
Iraqi Statute], available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/human_rights/Statute.htm. [Reproduced in accompanying
Notebook 1 at Tab 11].
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purpose” liability has become interchangeable with “joint criminal enterprise” liability, and the
evidentiary requirements for the doctrine have been set forth and followed in a host of cases
spanning more than ten years. In keeping with this jurisprudence, because Article 15(b)(4) of the
IST Statute explicitly provides for common purpose liability, it also encompasses joint criminal
enterprise.
2. The wording of Article 15(b)(4) differs from the comparable JCE provisions of the
other tribunals.
Article 15(b)(4) of the IST Statute is identical to Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) and differs textually from the provisions used at the
ICTY, ICTR and SCSL to impose joint criminal enterprise liability. This textual difference
raises two important issues. First, the IST provision directly provides for common purpose
liability, whereas the other courts have had to interpret common purpose liability is implied by
their statutes. The clear provision of Article 15(b)(4) is likely to bolster the legitimacy of the
IST’s use of the JCE doctrine since it is now recognized both by statute and by the jurisprudence
of the other courts. Second, the IST provision explicitly spells out the mental states necessary to
incur liability for crimes committed by persons acting with a common purpose, rather than
relying on a judge-made doctrine that defines the contours of the theory. However, the IST mens
rea requirements are not the same as those set forth in the jurisprudence of the other tribunals, so
the IST must decide how to handle this discrepancy.
3. The mens rea requirements in Article 15(b)(4) seem to preclude use of the Extended
JCE, which has been highly successful in prosecuting powerful individuals before the
other tribunals.
The wording of the IST Statute calls for a higher mens rea than that required by the
jurisprudence of the other tribunals. While this higher requirement seems to continue to allow
the IST to prosecute individuals using the first two categories of JCE liability, it seems to

2

preclude use of the third category, known as the Extended JCE. Specifically, the IST provision
requires the accused to know of the group’s intention to commit a crime, but if the crime is
committed by another member of the group and falls outside the scope of the original common
purpose, the defendant quite possibly could not have known it would happen. The Extended JCE
used by the ICTY and the other tribunals allows for such a possibility, imposing responsibility if
it was foreseeable that such a crime could occur and the accused continued to participate in spite
of the risk. This “dolus eventualis” or “advertent recklessness” mens rea standard has been
criticized, but the Extended JCE has also been widely and successfully used in cases against
individuals with the highest levels of authority when other forms of liability may have failed. If
the IST Statute precludes use of this type of JCE, successful prosecution of such individuals may
be problematic.
4. If the IST determines that the mens rea requirements of Article 15(b)(4) do indeed
preclude use of the Extended JCE as set forth by the other tribunals, the IST might still
choose to follow the jurisprudence of the other courts.
The IST may choose to apply the jurisprudence of the other international tribunals (which
allows for the Extended JCE) because it reflects general legal principles and customary
international law. Following established case law serves several interests: it holds the most
blameworthy criminal masterminds liable for atrocities from which they are far removed, it
maintains consistency between the international criminal law courts and presents a unified
precedent, and it signals an interest in upholding international law principles. However, it also
deviates from the IST Statute, which may allow for conviction but delegitimize the proceedings.

3

5. If the IST precludes use of the Extended JCE and does not choose to follow the
jurisprudence of the other tribunals, it may choose to adopt conspiracy as another form
of common purpose liability in order to prosecute blameworthy individuals.
Several circumstances favor interpreting Article 15(b)(4) to encompass conspiracy as a
form of common purpose liability. First, the Nuremberg Tribunal recognized conspiracy as a
theory of liability and as a substantive crime, establishing important precedent for the use of
conspiracy in trials against war criminals. Second, the international community recognizes
conspiracy as a crime when it is connected to serious crimes such as genocide, drug trafficking
and apartheid, and the crimes within the jurisdiction of the IST are equally grave. Third, the
ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic set precedent that a form of common purpose liability may be
implied by the statute. Fourth, the use of conspiracy in the IST context is upheld by the legality
principle because the Iraqi penal code has recognized conspiracy as a crime since at least 1969,
unlike many other national legal systems.

Finally, by adopting a restricted application of

conspiracy and by clearly defining its evidentiary requirements in order to dispel the confusion
and criticism associated with conspiracy at the Nuremberg trials, defendants could still be held
responsible for agreeing and intending to commit a crime whether the crimes that resulted fell
outside the scope of the original agreement or not.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Before proceeding to the legal analysis, it is necessary to discuss two series of crimes that
were perpetrated against Iraqi citizens in the 1980s. 2 The legal analysis that follows will explore
how these facts fit the contours of “common purpose” liability so that individual participants

2

As the facts were presented in the Jan. 3, 2005 privileged e-mail sent by the assigning contact at the IST to
Professor Michael P. Scharf for the purposes of the War Crimes Research Project. No additional sources were
consulted to confirm or substantiate the facts as presented therein.
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before the Iraqi Special Tribunal may be held criminally responsible for their involvement in
committing these crimes.
A.

Al-Dujayl
On July 11, 1982, a motorcade carrying Saddam Hussein was traveling through the

village of Al-Dujayl when it was stopped by a group of local villagers. After one woman marked
the vehicle believed to be carrying Saddam Hussein with red paint, an unknown number of other
individuals began to fire upon the car with AK-47s and other small weapons, killing several
bodyguards. The ensuing gunfight left approximately 150 people dead. Unbeknownst to the
assailants, Saddam Hussein had moved to another car in the convoy before the attack began and
was able to escape by calling in reinforcements from the army. In response to the attack,
Saddam Hussein allegedly ordered certain individuals to conduct reprisals against the inhabitants
of the town. According to press and Internet reports, large portions of Al-Dujayl were bulldozed,
247,000 acres of orchards and palm groves were destroyed, residents of the town were deported
to Iran, 387 residents were detained until as late as 1986, and as many as 500 people from AlDujayl (including children) were summarily killed. It is even reported that Saddam Hussein
ordered all of the date trees in town to be cut down.
B. Operation Anfal
Between February 23, 1988 and September 6, 1988, soldiers from the Iraqi army
conducted a series of eight military operations (collectively named Operation Anfal) against
members of the Kurdish minority residing in northern Iraq. Estimates from Human Rights
Watch indicate that more than 100,000 Kurdish men, women, and children were killed by mass
executions, chemical attacks, and systematic firing squads. Approximately 2,000 villages near
the border of Iran and elsewhere in Iraq were destroyed. Not only did soldiers destroy residential
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structures in civilian areas, but they also looted civilian property and farm animals, arbitrarily
arrested villagers captured in designated “prohibited areas,” and carried out mass deportations
and relocations from northern Iraq to camps located in non-Kurdish areas of the country.

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
Hitler was the chief villain. But for the defendants to put all blame on
him is neither manly nor true. We know that even the head of the state
has the same limits to his senses and to the hours of his days as do
lesser men. He must rely on others to be his eyes and ears as to most
that goes on in a great empire. Other legs must run his errands; other
hands must execute his plans. 3
- Robert H. Jackson, Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg
On the Guilt of the Leader and His Followers
July 26, 1946
A. Individual Criminal Responsibility
Article 15 of the IST Statute imposes individual criminal responsibility on defendants
who commit or help commit crimes within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The emphasis on holding
individuals responsible for their participation in war crimes can be traced back to the Nazi war
criminal trials held more than sixty years ago in Nuremberg. Seven principles emerged from
these proceedings, which still form a solid foundation for modern-day trials at the ICTY, ICTR,
SCSL, and now, the IST. 4 In short, the Nuremberg principles established that a person who
committed a crime or was complicit in the commission of a crime under the Nuremberg
Tribunal’s jurisdiction was criminally responsible and liable for punishment, even if the

3

MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL, 1945-46: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 184 (1997).
[Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 41.]

4

JOHN R.W.D. JONES, THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
AND RWANDA 125 (2d ed. 2000). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 40.]

6

individual was acting as a head of State, a Government official, or on the order of a superior. 5
Today, all of the tribunal statutes contain similar provisions: Article 7 of the ICTY Statute, 6
Article 6 of the ICTR 7 and SCSL Statutes, 8 and Article 15 of the IST Statute. 9
From the moment the war crimes tribunals were conceived, it was understood that they
would be used to seek punishment for key individuals who “orchestrated crimes of such
magnitude as to attract international concern, rather than the individual executants.” 10 The U.N.
Security Council endorsed the prosecutorial policy that “civilian, military and paramilitary
leaders should be tried before [the Tribunals] in preference to minor actors.” 11 One legal advisor
at the ICTR noted that Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute ensures that an accused head of State or
other Government official does not evade responsibility just because he held office when the
crime was committed. 12 In addition, the Kordic Trial Chamber stated that “a superior who
orders the killing of a civilian may be held responsible . . . as might a political leader who plans

5

Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the
Tribunal, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/nurnberg.htm. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at
Tab 5.]

6

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc
S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter Yugoslavia Statute], available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm.
[Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 9.]
7

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994) [hereinafter Rwanda Statute], available at http://www.un.org/ictr/statute.html. [Reproduced in accompanying
Notebook 1 at Tab 10.]
8

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc S/RES/1315 (2000)
[hereinafter Sierra Leone Statute], available at www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html. [Reproduced in accompanying
Notebook 1 at Tab 12.]

9

Iraqi Statute, supra note 1.

10

JONES, supra note 4, at 130.

11

S.C. Res. 1329 (Nov. 30, 2000). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 8.]

12

Alex Obote-Odora, The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Article 6 Responsibilities, 1
LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 343, 343 (Aug. 2002). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab
50.]
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that certain civilians or groups of civilians should be executed, and passes these instructions on
to a military commander.” 13

Thus, prosecutors have indicted leaders such as Slobodan

Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, Radislav Krstic, Clemen Kayishema, Charles
Taylor, and Samuel Hinga Norman for formulating or endorsing criminal plans even though
other actors physically carried them to fruition.14
Former ICTY Judge Antonio Cassese explained that bringing such “culprits” to justice
not only establishes individual responsibility and exonerates the rest of the population from guilt,
but it also dissipates the call for revenge, helps victims find reconciliation because they know
their tormentors have paid for their crimes, and establishes a fully reliable record of the atrocities
so future generations can remember and be made fully cognizant of what happened. 15

These

13

Prosecutor v. Kordic et al., Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement, 26 Feb. 2001, para. 373 [hereinafter Kordic Trial
Judgement]. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 18.]
14

Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, 16 June 2004,
para. 140 (Prosecution accused former Serb leader Milosevic of participating in a joint criminal enterprise to destroy
Bosnian Muslims as a group) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 27]; Prosecutor v. Karadzic &
Mladic, Case No. IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, Review of the Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, 11 July 1996, para. 86 (found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the former
Serb leaders planned and ordered genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes or, at the very least, did not
prevent or punish them) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 17]; Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-9833-A, Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 237-239 (the Appeals Chamber overturned Bosnian Serb General Krstic’s
conviction as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise to commit genocide but upheld that he willingly participated
in the joint criminal enterprise to forcibly transfer Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly out of Srebrenica,
which amounted to persecution, a crime against humanity) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 23];
The Prosecutor v. Kayishema et al., Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, 21 May 1999, para. 567-568 (the former
prefect was convicted on four counts of genocide for ordering and participating in four massacres that resulted in the
deaths of thousands of ethnic Tutsis in 1994, upheld on appeal) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab
34]; The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I, Indictment, 7 Mar. 2003, para.23-25
(charged the former President of the Republic of Liberia with participation in a joint criminal enterprise to gain
political power and control over Sierra Leone and its diamond mines, resulting in unlawful killings, abductions,
forced labor, physical and sexual violence, and other crimes) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 39];
The Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman et al., Case No. SCSL-03-14-I, Indictment, 5 Feb. 2004, para. 19 (charged
the former National Coordinator of the CDF with the participating in the common plan to use any means necessary
to defeat the RUF/AFRC forces and to gain and exercise control over the territory of Sierra Leone, which led, inter
alia, to unlawful killings, looting, terrorizing civilians, destruction of private property, and use of child soldiers)
[reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 37].

15

Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (Jan. 1998). [Reproduced
in accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 48].
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were important aims for the Nuremberg Tribunal, and they remain chief goals of the tribunals of
today. 16
The main criticisms aimed at the Nuremberg war crimes trials involved the perception
that the Tribunal was applying laws ex post facto, inadequately protecting the rights of the
accused, and administering “victor’s justice.” 17

The ICTY acknowledged that it made a

conscious effort to avoid some of the flaws of its predecessor, but one commentator concluded
the new proceedings would still invite many of the same criticisms that faced the first
international war crimes Tribunal.18 To help legitimize the proceedings in the eyes of the public,
the statutes of the contemporary tribunals strike a balance between civil and common law
traditions and blend universal characteristics and principles found in domestic criminal law,
international human rights law, and transitional justice. 19
For example, the tribunals’ individual criminal responsibility provisions follow the
criminal law paradigm, holding that people who freely choose to do criminal acts are responsible
for the resulting evil and deserve commensurate punishment for their deliberate wrongdoings.20
The provisions also promote the goals of international human rights law because they represent
the interests of the victims, and effective enforcement may deter potential actors from carrying

16

Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 915, 916 (Summer 2003).
[Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 54.]

17

MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE – THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL
SINCE NUREMBERG 11 (1997). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 43.]
18

Id. at 70.

19

Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 78. [Reproduced in
accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 49.]
20

J.C. SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 4 (9th ed. 1999). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab
44.]
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out egregious human rights violations in the future. 21

Finally, the provisions serve the

transitional justice model because they help confront the wrongs perpetrated by leaders of the
preceding regime, separating the old government from the new one—one that respects the rule of
law and promotes democracy. 22
Lessons learned from the Nuremberg Tribunal have given the modern criminal tribunals a
solid foundation to administer justice that is perceived both as fair and in keeping with
internationally accepted legal principles. But in the burgeoning field of international criminal
law, the tribunals have had to confront new situations where no clear precedent exists. In this
setting, the theory of common purpose liability has emerged as a crucial tool for international
prosecutions.
B. The Five Forms of Direct Responsibility in the Tribunals’ Statutes
The ICTY, ICTR and SCSL Statutes reflect the Nuremberg principles by attaching
criminal responsibility to anyone who “[1] planned, [2] instigated, [3] ordered, [4] committed or
[5] otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime” within the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction. 23 These five forms of direct responsibility encompass two forms of
principal liability and three accessorial, as explained in the Kordic Trial Chamber Judgement. 24
In other words, a defendant can be found guilty as a principal for physically committing the
crime himself or planning it with others, or he can be found guilty as an accessory by relying on

21

Danner & Martinez, supra note 19, at 87.

22

Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 69 (Spring 2003).
accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 55.]
23

[Reproduced in

Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 6, Art. 7(1); Rwanda Statute, supra note 7, Art. 6(1); Sierra Leone Statute, supra
note 8, Art. 6(1).
24

Kordic Trial Judgement, supra note 13, para. 373.
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someone else to physically commit the crime. 25 Thus, if the defendant interacted with others by
aiding and abetting the crime, instigating it, or ordering it, and the other individuals carried the
crime to completion, the defendant is just as blameworthy as if he physically committed the
crime himself—he shares equally in the liability with the principal.
C. Interpreting the Statutes to Include Common Purpose Liability, or Joint Criminal
Enterprise (“JCE”)
In the first case before the ICTY, café owner and local politician Dusko Tadic 26 was
convicted for the persecution, beatings, and abuse of non-Serbs as part of a Serbian “ethnic
cleansing” policy, 27 but he was acquitted of the murder of five men in the village of Jaskici
because no evidence established that he was personally responsible for executing them. 28 On
appeal, the murder acquittal was reversed.29 The Appeals Chamber explained that because Tadic
committed inhumane acts as part of the attack on Jaskici, he “actively took part in the common
criminal purpose to rid the Prijedor region of the non-Serb population” when it was foreseeable
that non-Serbs might be killed, and he willingly took the risk that the actions of his group would
lead to such killings. 30 Thus, his participation in the common criminal plan of “ethnic cleansing”
made him liable for the murders, even if he did not kill the men himself. The judges established
that liability from participation in a “common purpose” was implicit in the Statute.
25

Danner & Martinez, supra note 19, at 102.

26

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 181, 188 [hereinafter Tadic
Trial Judgment]. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 30.]
27

JONES, supra note 4, at 4-5.

28

Richard P. Barrett & Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslav Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy Law in
International Tribunals, 88 MINN. L. REV. 30, 39 (Nov. 2003). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab
47.]
29

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, 15 July 1999, para. 233 [hereinafter Tadic Appeals
Judgement]. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 31.]

30

Id., para. 231-233.
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The ICTY Appeals Chamber conceded that liability for participation in a common plan
was not one of the Statute’s enumerated five forms of direct responsibility, but the Statute did
not exclude it, either. 31 It explained that the grave nature of international war crimes justified
this interpretation:
Although only some members of the group may physically
perpetrate the criminal act (murder, extermination, wanton
destruction of cities, towns or villages, etc.), the participation and
contribution of the other members of the group is often vital in
facilitating the commission of the offence in question. It follows
that the moral gravity of such participation is often no less – or
indeed no different – from that of those actually carrying out the
acts in question. 32
The Appeals Chamber clarified its interpretation that common purpose liability (or joint
criminal enterprise) was implied by the Statute in its decision on a motion challenging the
tribunal’s jurisdiction over joint criminal enterprise in a separate case. 33 The Appeals Chamber
explained that when the ICTY was formed, the Secretary-General’s Report to the Security
Council 34 indicated that the court’s jurisdiction was determined both by the Statute and by
customary international law. 35 The principles of legality and nullem crimen sine lege, nulla
poena sine lege 36 required the Tribunal to consider when the alleged acts were committed and

31

Id., para. 190.

32

Id., para. 191.

33

Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging
Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003 [hereinafter Milutinovic decision]. [Reproduced in
accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 28.]
34

Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), para. 29,
Presented 3 May 1993 (S/25704), available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/S25704.htm. [Reproduced in
accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 6.]
35

Milutinvoic decision, supra note 33, para. 9.

36

No crime without law, no punishment without law.
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apply the law that was customary and binding at that time. 37

Because the Tadic Appeals

Chamber had determined that JCE was customary international law around 1992, it was binding
at the time of Ojdanic’s alleged crimes in 1998-1999, the tribunal had jurisdiction, and the
motion was dismissed. 38
D. JCE is Frequently Used by the Tribunals
Joint criminal enterprise has become increasingly important at the ICTY—81% of all
indictments between June 25, 2001 and January 1, 2004 based liability on this doctrine. 39
Prosecutors at the SCSL are following the ICTY’s example in using JCE to hold defendants
liable. The key leaders of the three groups that were involved in the armed conflict in Sierra
Leone have all been charged with participating in joint criminal enterprises to gain control over
the territory and its diamond mines. 40 The indictments allege that this participation led to
numerous atrocities such as unlawful killings, physical mutilations, abductions, destruction of
civilian property, and sexual violence.
37

Milutinovic decision, supra note 33, para. 9-10.

38

Id., para. 10, 17, 45.

While the SCSL cases are in the early phases of

39

Danner & Martinez, supra note 19, at 107. (Prior to July 2004, phrases like acting “in concert” were read as
implicit references to the JCE theory, thus 34 out of 43 indictments in the approximately 2.5 year period
incorporated JCE.) See also Kelly D. Askin, Reflections on Some of the Most Significant Achievements of the ICTY,
37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 903, 910-11 (Spring 2003) (“In the last two years, it appears that participating in a joint
criminal enterprise has become the principal charging preference in ICTY indictments, and it is particularly effective
when charged in conjunction with persecution.”). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 46.]
40

The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, supra note 14, para. 23-25 (charged the former President of the
Republic of Liberia and other AFRC leaders with participating in a joint criminal enterprise to gain political power
and control over Sierra Leone and its diamond mines, resulting in unlawful killings, abductions, forced labor,
physical and sexual violence, and other crimes); The Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman et al., supra note 14,
para. 19 (charged former CDF leaders with participating in a common plan to use any means necessary to defeat the
RUF/AFRC forces, leading, inter alia, to unlawful killings, looting, terrorizing civilians, destruction of private
property, and use of child soldiers); The Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL-2004-15-PT,
Amended Consolidated Indictment, 13 May 2004, para. 36-38 (charged the former RUF leaders with participating in
a joint criminal enterprise to gain and exercise political power and control over the territory of Sierra Leone and its
natural resources, particularly the diamonds, which led to unlawful killings, abductions, forced labor, physical and
sexual violence, use of child soldiers, and other crimes). [Sesay is reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab
38.]
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prosecution and have yet to be decided, the strategic use of JCE is clearly an important tool for
making sure these individuals are held criminally responsible for such crimes.
The ICTR, however, has been slower to embrace joint criminal enterprise as a liability
theory in its jurisprudence, perhaps because the crimes that took place there fit more
appropriately under conspiracy to commit genocide, removing the need for recourse to JCE. 41
However, at least two recent indictments at the ICTR do rely in part on JCE principles,
mentioning common schemes and acting in concert with others, but these have not yet gone to
trial for the ICTR to construe the JCE jurisprudence from the ICTY. 42
For these reasons, the bulk of the jurisprudence analysis that follows will be based on
JCE cases tried before the ICTY.
E. The Tribunals Divide JCE into Three Categories
The Tadic Appeals Chamber essentially created a new theory of individual criminal
responsibility not defined by the ICTY Statute, so it devoted a substantial part of its written
decision clarifying the contours of the doctrine. First, it concluded that “broadly speaking, the
notion of common purpose encompasses three distinct categories of collective criminality,”
basing its analysis on an extensive scrutiny of post-World War II war crimes case law involving
complicit liability. 43

41

Danner & Martinez, supra note 19, at 169 n. 135.

42

Id. See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-I, Amended Indictment, 5 Nov. 2003,
para. 10 (alleging that Zigiranyirazo by agreement with or in concert with others “ordered, authorised or participated
in various meetings of regional and local administrative officials . . . in order to plan, organise or facilitate attacks on
the Tutsis in the Gisenyi prefecture”)[reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 36]; The Prosecutor v.
Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-I, Indictment, 8 June 2001, para. 33 (alleging that Seromba “established a plan or
a common scheme to execute the extermination of Tutsi in Kivumu commune”. [Reproduced in accompanying
Notebook 2 at Tab 35.]
43

Tadic Appeals Judgement, supra note 29, para. 195; see also Christopher J. Knezevic, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law International War Crimes Research Lab: Joint Criminal Enterprise – What is the Degree
of Participation Required for Conviction? An Exhaustive Memo of the Jurisprudence on Joint Criminal Enterprise,
at 10-18, available at http://law.case.edu/War-Crimes-Research-Portal/memoranda/Cknezevic.pdf (Spring 2004)
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The first category of cases involves joint criminal enterprise at its most basic form
(“Basic JCE”), where perpetrators act pursuant to a common design and share the same criminal
intention. 44

For example, co-perpetrators may formulate a plan to kill. One perpetrator may

inflict non-fatal violence upon the victim, another may provide a place or the means to carry out
the plan, and a third might serve as a lookout while the fourth member strikes the fatal blow.
Although they all participated in different ways and to different degrees, they all intended the
result and would thus all be liable for murder. 45 The Court noted that it was not necessary for
the perpetrator’s involvement to be a crucial link in causing the end result, but knowledge of the
intended purpose of the criminal enterprise was required. 46 Thus, an omission to stop a crime
from being committed when there was a duty to act could also be considered participation in the
joint enterprise.
The second category of joint criminal enterprise relates to concentration camps or
systems of ill-treatment and can be labeled the “Systemic JCE.” 47 Factors in assessing the
penalty for participation in this type of enterprise include the position of authority held by the
accused and the individual’s degree of participation in enforcing the system that ill-treats the
detainees. 48

(for a more thorough analysis of the post-World War II war crimes cases that supported the Chamber’s decision).
[Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 58.]
44

Tadic Appeals Judgement, supra note 29, para. 196.

45

Id., para. 196-201.

46

Id., para. 199.

47

Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgement, 25 Feb. 2004, para. 98 [hereinafter Vasiljevic Appeals
Judgement]. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 33.]

48

Tadic Appeals Judgement, supra note 29, para. 203.
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The third category of joint criminal enterprise is the “Extended JCE,” 49 which has been
criticized because it involves offenses that fall outside the original common design, and often
such consequences seem attenuated from the enterprise. 50 In this category, if a perpetrator
intends to participate in a common design pursuing one course of conduct and another
perpetrator commits an act outside of that plan, the first perpetrator is criminally liable if the act
was a natural and foreseeable consequence of carrying out the joint criminal enterprise. 51 For
example, if a group is forcibly evicting civilians belonging to a particular ethnic group by
burning their houses, if some of the participants, in carrying out the plan, set a house on fire
while a civilian is still inside, all of the other participants in the plan are criminally responsible
for killing that civilian because it was foreseeable that an individual might be inside a home and
unable to escape. 52 While the death of the civilian was not part of the original common purpose,
it was a predictable consequence of carrying out the plan to evict civilians by burning their
homes, and the participants were either reckless or indifferent to that risk. 53
Because the Extended JCE goes beyond the original common purpose of the enterprise
and thus has additional evidentiary requirements, it is important for prosecutors to classify a joint
criminal enterprise correctly in order to meet the burden of proof required for that particular
category of JCE.

49

Vasiljevic Appeals Judgement, supra note 47, para. 99.

50

Barrett & Little, supra note 28, at 40.

51

Tadic Appeals Judgement, supra note 29, para. 204.

52

Id. See also Kordic Trial Judgement, supra note 13, para. 396.

53

Tadic Appeals Judgement, supra note 29, para. 204.
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F. The Tribunals Define the Evidentiary Requirements of JCE
“[C]rime exists only when actus reus and mens rea coincide” because an act does not
make a man guilty of a crime unless his mind is guilty also. 54 Just as with other criminal
violations, to successfully prosecute a defendant for a crime within the IST’s jurisdiction,
prosecutors must prove both the actus reus and the mens rea prongs of the crime. The specific
actus reus and mens rea requirements of joint criminal enterprise liability have been set forth in
the jurisprudence of the tribunals. Each of the three categories of JCE has its own specific
evidentiary requirements, so the contours of the doctrine are set forth in detail below.
1. The Actus Reus Prong of JCE
The first aspect of a crime that the prosecution must prove is the actus reus, or the
forbidden act. The Tadic Appeals Chamber requires three actus reus elements to prove for each
JCE category:
(1)

a “plurality of persons” that need not be organized in any
particular military, political or administrative structure;

(2)

the “existence of a common plan,” which amounts to or
involves the commission of a crime listed in the Tribunal
Statute; and

(3)

participation in the “execution of the common plan.” 55

Clearly, more than one person must take part in committing the crime to satisfy the first
element of actus reus, but the second element is less clear. The Krnojelac Trial Chamber shed
some light on how the existence of a common plan could be established:
The understanding or arrangement need not be express, and its
existence may be inferred from all the circumstances. It need not
have been reached at any time before the crime is committed. The
54

SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 20, at 28, and 28, n. 7.

55

Tadic Appeals Judgement, supra note 29, para. 227. See also Kordic Trial Judgement, supra note 13, para. 397.
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circumstances in which two or more persons are participating
together in the commission of a particular crime may themselves
establish an unspoken understanding or arrangement amounting to
an agreement formed between them then and there to commit that
crime. 56
Thus, an agreement does not have to be spoken or show any advance planning. If an
understanding between the parties forms, either before the outlawed crime is committed or
extemporaneously, and that understanding can be inferred from all of the surrounding
circumstances, a common plan exists.
In connection with the third prong of the actus reus test, at least one Trial Chamber
presiding over a Systemic JCE case required a “substantial level of participation” that rises above
following orders to perform some low-level function in the criminal endeavor on a single
occasion. 57 The level of participation attributed to the accused and whether that participation is
deemed “significant” depends on several factors, perhaps most importantly the seriousness and
scope of the crimes committed. 58 Others include:
[T]he size of the criminal enterprise, the functions performed, the position
of the accused, the amount of time spent participating after acquiring
knowledge of the criminality of the system, efforts made to prevent
criminal activity or to impeded the efficient functioning of the system, the
seriousness and scope of the crimes committed and the efficiency,
zealousness or gratuitous cruelty exhibited in performing the actor’s
function. 59

56

Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgement, 15 Mar. 2002, para. 80. [hereinafter Krnojelac Trial
Judgement]. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 20.]
57

Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, 2 Nov. 2001, para. 311 [hereinafter Kvocka Trial
Judgement]. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 24.]

58

Id. (The Trial Chamber noted: “even a lowly guard who pulls the switch to release poisonous gas into the gas
chamber holding hundreds of victims would be more culpable than a supervising guard stationed at the perimeter of
the camp who shoots a prisoner attempting to escape.”)
59

Id.

18

A recent ICTY Appeals Chamber, however, disagreed. “Contrary to the holding of the
Trial Chamber, the Tribunal’s case-law does not require participation as co-perpetrator in a joint
criminal enterprise to have been significant, unless otherwise stated.” 60
2. The Mens Rea Prong of JCE
In addition to proving the actus reus, determining if a perpetrator had the relevant mens
rea, or guilty mind, is crucial to prosecution because “[c]riminal law does not, as a general rule,
address accidental behaviour,” and those who break the law are expected to intend the
consequences of their acts. 61
The ICTY, ICTR and SCSL Statutes do not contain a provision that directly mentions the
mens rea requirements associated with joint criminal enterprise, but from their earliest rulings,
the tribunal judges “have simply assumed that mens rea is an essential element of the offences
within their jurisdiction.” 62 Once again, it is necessary to turn to commentary in the tribunals’
case law to find clarification on this aspect of the evidentiary requirement for common purpose
liability.
The Tadic Appeals Chamber established different mens rea requirements for each
category of JCE. 63 For joint criminal enterprise liability to attach, the following mental states
must be present:
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Basic JCE (Category One):
The intent to perpetrate a certain crime (shared by all of the coperpetrators);
Systemic JCE (Category Two):
(a)

Personal knowledge of the system of ill-treatment (which can be
proven by express testimony or by reasonable inference from the
accused’s position of authority); and

(b)

The intent to further this common concerted system of illtreatment.

The Extended JCE (Category Three):
(a)

The intent to participate in and further the criminal activity or the
criminal purpose of a group and to contribute to the JCE or in any
event to the commission of a crime by the group.

(b)

If a crime other than the one agreed upon in the common plan
arises, responsibility for that crime arises only if:
i. It was foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by
one or other members of the group and
ii. The accused willingly took that risk. 64

To be clear, the participant’s intent in a Basic or Systemic JCE must be to further the
enterprise or system of ill-treatment. The participant does not have to have the intent to commit
the specific crimes that result in carrying out the goals of the enterprise to be held liable.
Furthermore, participants in a Basic or Systemic JCE must share the required intent of the
principal perpetrators, so if the mens rea of a crime combines an additional element with intent,
the Prosecution must demonstrate that the accused shared the additional element as well in order
to find him liable as a co-perpetrator in a JCE. 65 For example, the crime of persecution requires
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discriminatory intent, so the co-perpetrator’s mental state must have a discriminatory element
also. But “[i]f the accused does not share the discriminatory intent, then he may still be liable as
an aider and abettor if he knowingly made a substantial contribution to the crime.” 66
The Extended JCE lowers the mens rea from intent to “dolus eventualis” or “advertent
recklessness,” 67 garnering great criticism because “it effectively lowers the mens rea required for
commission of the principal crime without affording any dimunition in the sentence imposed.” 68
One expert warns that stretching the notion of individual mens rea too thin might wind up
imposing criminal liability on individuals for guilt by association—a result at odds with the
underlying principle of the international tribunals seeking to punish the most blameworthy
individuals. 69 Indeed, diluting the mens rea standard when relying upon joint criminal enterprise
as a theory of criminal liability may “inevitably diminish the didactic significance of the
Tribunal’s judgements and . . . compromise its historical legacy.” 70
3. An Illustrative Example of the Evidentiary Requirements of JCE
An example based loosely on one supplied by the Tadic Appeals Chamber 71 may help
illustrate how the evidentiary requirements work together: Suppose a defendant willingly and
intentionally takes part in a plan to evict civilians belonging to a particular ethnic group from a
village. He supplies guns to other participants in the enterprise so that they may hold the
66
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villagers at gunpoint and forcibly remove them from the community, which they do. As part of a
Basic JCE, he is criminally liable for a crime against humanity.

First, the actus reus

requirements are met: there is (1) a plurality of persons, (2) a common plan to forcibly evict
civilians from their homes, which is outlawed by the Statute, and (3) the defendant participated
by supplying the guns that allowed the other participants to evict the villagers using a threat of
force. The mens rea requirements are also satisfied for a Basic JCE—the co-perpetrators all
shared the intent to evict the ethnic group from the village.
Taking this example one step further, suppose a co-perpetrator’s gun accidentally fires
during the eviction and mass chaos ensues, leaving 150 civilians dead. 72 What began as a Basic
JCE escalated to an Extended JCE where crimes were committed that fell outside of the original
scope of the enterprise. The actus reus analysis for liability remains the same and has already
been satisfied, so the defendant’s liability under an Extended JCE hinges on his mens rea. The
defendant might argue that he joined the enterprise to evict the villagers so he could move into a
nicer home—not because he wanted to “ethnically cleanse” the neighborhood, and he certainly
never wanted to kill anyone. Is he criminally liable for the killings? Under the Extended JCE,
he is. It is not necessary to show the defendant had the intent to commit the killings, the intent is
tied to furthering the criminal enterprise of evicting the civilians.73 As demonstrated in the Basic
JCE analysis, it has already been established that he had the intent to participate in and further
the criminal enterprise of evicting civilians. Now, a prosecutor would have to show: (1) it was
foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by another member of the group, and (2) the
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defendant willingly took that risk. 74 In this case, it was foreseeable that providing guns for the
purpose of forcibly evicting civilians from their homes would lead to a volatile situation where
emotions were on edge and someone could get shot. Even if the situation had involved a calm
eviction, putting guns in the hands of other people carries the risk that at least one of those
participants might use the gun to kill someone. Nevertheless, the defendant took that risk and
participated in the enterprise to evict the civilians. JCE liability attaches.
G. Distinguishing Between JCE and Aiding and Abetting
Each form of direct responsibility listed in the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL individual criminal
responsibility provision has its own actus reus requirements that stand apart from those of JCE. 75
But keeping “aiding and abetting” separate from pursuing a common purpose or joint criminal
enterprise is problematic because both seem to involve providing some form of assistance. 76 The
Tribunals first draw a distinction in who receives the assistance. The aider and abettor helps a
single person commit a single crime, but the co-perpetrator supports the crimes of a group of
persons involved in a joint criminal enterprise. 77
The second distinction lies in the mens rea requirement. The aider and abettor must have
knowledge that the act will assist the commission of a specific crime by the principal. 78 The coperpetrator, however, must have intent to further the criminal purpose of a group. In a recent
decision, the Appeals Chamber noted that whenever an accused participated in a crime that
74
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advanced the goals of the criminal enterprise, the Trial Chamber considered him more likely to
be held responsible as a co-perpetrator than as an aider or abettor. 79
Understanding the distinctions between contributing to a JCE and aiding and abetting
allows prosecutors to charge defendants more accurately and effectively, while the judiciary can
better fix an appropriate sentence and render consistent decisions that prevent future confusion. 80
H. Applying the Evidentiary Requirements – A Look at the Tribunals’ Jurisprudence
1. Category One: The Basic JCE
Vasiljevic Trial
Mitar Vasiljevic was convicted by an ICTY Trial Chamber for crimes against humanity
and violations of the laws or customs of war. 81 His crimes included murder, inhumane acts, and
persecution, all of which were found to stem from his participation in a joint criminal enterprise
to murder seven Muslim men. 82

In short, the Trial Chamber found that there was an

understanding amounting to an agreement between Vasiljevic and at least two other men to kill
seven Muslim men. 83 Furthermore, Vasiljevic participated in this JCE to murder by preventing
the seven Muslim men from fleeing by pointing a gun at them while they were detained at the
Vilina Vlas Hotel, by escorting them to the bank of the Drina River while pointing a gun at them
to prevent their escape, and by standing behind the Muslim men with his gun together with the
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other offenders. 84 The men were forced to line up facing the river, and the perpetrators opened
fire, killing five of the seven. 85
Vasiljevic Appeal
Vasiljevic appealed his conviction on the grounds, inter alia, that the Trial Chamber
erred in applying the concept of joint criminal enterprise because it erred in finding that an
agreement existed. 86 He also contended the Trial Chamber erred when it found that he provided
assistance to the other perpetrators, and there was no proof he actually participated in the
shooting. 87
Before reviewing the alleged errors, the Appeals Chamber determined that the “Drina
River incident” fell into the basic, first category of joint criminal enterprise.88 Although the facts
of the case might have fit under Extended JCE liability, the Court rejected classifying the case as
such because the Prosecution did not plead it at the trial level. 89 Then the Court reiterated that a
“common plan or purpose may materialise extemporaneously and be inferred from the fact that a
plurality of persons acts in unison to put into effect a joint criminal enterprise.”90 Even if there
was no formal understanding between Vasiljevic and his companions, the findings of fact from
the Trial Chamber indicated Vasiljevic acted in unison with his companions, which allowed an
inference that a joint criminal enterprise existed to kill the seven Muslim men. Whether or not
84
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Vasiljevic pulled the trigger was irrelevant once it was determined that a JCE was in effect and
all participants in the JCE were criminally liable for the actions of the other perpetrators.
2. Category Two: The Systemic JCE
Kvocka Trial – The Omarska Prison Camp
The Kvocka case provides a good example of jurisprudence related to Systemic JCEs
because Omarska was one of the most brutal prison camps in all of Bosnia and perhaps the first
to capture the rest of the world’s attention. Patricia McGowan Wald, a former Judge for the
ICTY who sat on the Kvocka trial in 2000-2001, 91 recounted the conditions of the camp:
Omarska [was] a hastily-converted mining complex with open pits
and huge hangar-like buildings, [which] housed up to 1,000 men
while another thousand ‘had to lie on their bellies’ on the tarmac
outside. Armed guards ordered excruciating tortures of their
civilian prisoners, forcing them to castrate other prisoners, engage
in acts of cannibalism, and violate each other. The prisoners
received no medical help, were kept on starvation diets, and
allowed no visitors. ‘All the grass has been eaten by the people,’
Gutman wrote. When the camp closed down, 500 to 1,000
prisoners remained ‘missing’ and were never subsequently
accounted for. 92
The Serb defendants eventually brought before the ICTY to face charges regarding the
crimes at Omarska were not the commandant of the camp or the top officials in the region.93
Instead, Kvocka and three of his four co-defendants characterized themselves as guards without
responsibility. 94 The fifth defendant, Zoran Zigic, was not a guard but was allowed to enter the
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camp to torture prisoners. 95 From the outset, the Trial Chamber recognized that “none of the
accused was instrumental in establishing the camps or determining official policies practiced on
the detainees therein.” 96
Meeting the three conditions to qualify as a Systemic JCE was fairly straightforward in
this case. First, there was an organized system of ill-treatment at Omarska, which had already
been well documented in the Tadic trial, and second, the five defendants stipulated to the
deplorable conditions in the camp, 97 indicating an awareness of the nature of the system.
Finally, as guards at the camp, the first four men were undeniably participating in enforcing the
system of ill-treatment, and the fifth defendant voluntarily came into the camp to commit
heinous acts of abuse against Muslim prisoners, so his participation was indisputable as well.
These findings satisfied the mens rea requirements for a Systemic JCE.

Personal

knowledge was stipulated, and the intent to further the system of ill-treatment was evidenced by
the defendants’ continued employment at the camp (or in Zigic’s case, his frequent visits to the
camp to abuse the prisoners).
The Court also evaluated the actus reus elements. Clearly, a plurality of persons was
required to run Omarska, the criminal enterprise. The goal of that enterprise was to imprison
Bosnian Muslims, which was a crime against humanity within the ICTY Statute. 98 Thus, the
first and second actus reus conditions were satisfied. The third and final actus reus element
regarding whether the defendants’ level of participation rose to the level “significant” enough for
liability to attach was the main issue of this case.
95
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To assess participation in such an enterprise, the court evaluated several relevant factors,
such as the position of authority held by the accused and the individual’s degree of participation
in enforcing the system that ill-treated the detainees. 99 The Trial Chamber stated that when it
previously found General Krstic guilty as a co-perpetrator of a joint criminal enterprise, his
position of high authority allowed the conclusion that he was a principal perpetrator in the
JCE. 100 But here, as Judge Wald put it, “was the mere status of being a guard supervisor or
administrative aide enough to qualify a man as a perpetrator of a war crime or a crime against
humanity?” 101
The Court turned to cases considered by the Tadic Appeals Chamber and other postWorld War II cases to “shed light on whether persons holding mid-level positions who do not
individually commit crimes should be held accountable for crimes collectively, particularly when
the roles they play or functions they perform are simply part of their assigned jobs.” 102
Ultimately, it determined:
[W]hen a detention facility is operated in a manner which makes the
discriminatory and persecutory intent of the operation patently clear,
anyone who knowingly participates in a significant way in the operation of
the facility or assists or facilitates its activity, incurs individual criminal
responsibility for participation in the criminal enterprise, either as a coperpetrator or an aider and abettor, depending upon his position in the
organizational hierarchy and the degree of his participation. 103
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This case turned, therefore, on whether the defendants’ participation in the joint criminal
enterprise was “significant enough” to incur criminal responsibility under the evidentiary
requirements of a Systemic JCE. The Court found all five defendants guilty as co-perpetrators in
running the Omarska prison camp, a criminal enterprise, because without their guarding function
to keep the prisoners captive in deplorable surroundings where they were subjected to abuse,
there could have been no camp at all. 104 In spite of the fact that Kvocka worked at the camp a
mere 17 days, the trial court found that he was widely perceived as the camp commandant’s
deputy and as an experienced police officer who condoned the abuses and deplorable conditions
there, thus he was criminally liable.105 Zigic, “the opportunistic abuser who did not even hold a
camp position but gratuitously imposed his own reign of terror as a random night visitor to the
camp” was sentenced to 25 years as a co-perpetrator for playing a significant role in perpetrating
crimes as part of the enterprise, even though he had no position of authority there. 106
Kvocka Appeal
Four of the five defendants appealed, challenging their participation in a joint criminal
enterprise by arguing that a significant contribution could not be inferred from their low
positions of employment at the camp. 107 The Court responded that a position of authority is only
one piece of “relevant evidence for establishing the accused’s awareness of the system [and] his
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participation in enforcing or perpetuating the common criminal purpose of the system.” 108 In
addition, the Appeals Chamber unequivocally disagreed with the Trial Chamber’s stance
requiring a significant contribution and asserted that “the Tribunal’s case-law does not require
participation as co-perpetrator in a joint criminal enterprise to have been significant, unless
otherwise stated.” 109
After examining the actus reus aspect of the appeal, the Court turned to the subjective
mens rea challenges.

Kvocka advanced several arguments to illustrate that he lacked the

requisite intent to be a co-perpetrator in a joint criminal enterprise. The judges reviewed whether
the Trial Chamber was reasonable to infer that Kvocka had the intent in light of all the
surrounding circumstances, giving him the benefit of any doubt.

Ultimately, the Appeals

Chamber affirmed that he possessed intent and upheld the finding that he was guilty as a coperpetrator of crimes committed as part of the JCE. 110
3. Category Three: The Extended JCE
One of the most compelling justifications for use of the Extended JCE is the notion that it
is unfair to convict and imprison a middle-level officer of war crimes while his superior—the
principal offender—walks free because the court has no way to physically connect him to the
crimes that he orchestrated. The superior “pulling the strings” behind the scenes may not fit the
role of an accomplice who facilitates a crime, but he is still a perpetrator of the crime. 111
The flexibility of this category of joint criminal enterprise has given prosecutors an
increasingly effective way to build cases against key leaders where other forms of liability may
108
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be difficult to establish. 112 Professor William A. Schabas has called joint criminal enterprise the
“magic bullet” of the Office of the Prosecutor, 113 perhaps largely because of the amount of
prosecutorial and judicial discretion it allows. 114 How broadly or narrowly prosecutors describe
the criminal goal of the enterprise or judges construe foreseeability could have a dramatic impact
on an individual’s liability. 115 Also, the lowered mens rea requirement for the category makes it
more appealing for prosecution.
With these caveats in mind, the following analysis examines one ICTY case where the
defendant was a high-ranking official charged with responsibility for some of the most horrific
crimes in the Yugoslavian conflict.
Krstic Trial
The trial of General Radislav Krstic was the first ICTY trial to try the charge of genocide
through to completion. 116 When it began, General Krstic was the most senior military official to
stand trial at The Hague. 117 The Trial Chamber, in a Judgement rendered after hearing more
than 110 witnesses and reviewing mounds of evidence, poignantly painted what it described as
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“nine days of hell” in Srebrenica. 118 Nonetheless, the Court was careful to note that “[t]his
defendant, like all others, deserves individualised consideration and can be convicted only if the
evidence presented in court shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is guilty of acts that
constitute crimes covered by the Statute of the Tribunal.”119
In short, units of the Bosnian Serb Army (“VRS”) launched a 9-day attack on the village
of Srebrenica, located in Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite the fact that the area was designated as a
U.N. safe area. 120 Approximately 25,000 Bosnian Muslims living there were uprooted and, “in
an atmosphere of terror,” transported on overcrowded buses across conflict lines into BosnianMuslim held territory. 121 The military-aged Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica, however, were
“taken prisoner, detained in brutal conditions and then executed. More than 7,000 people were
never seen again.” 122
Facts later revealed:
[T]housands . . . were slaughtered in ‘carefully orchestrated mass
executions’ that ‘followed a well established pattern.’ The men were lined
up in groups of ten, blindfolded, wrists bound with wire ligatures, shoes
removed and then shot. Miraculously, a handful escaped to testify later at
the Hague. Immediately afterward and sometimes even during the
execution, earth-moving equipment arrived and their bodies were buried.
Months later they were reburied further north in Serb-held territory to
avoid discovery as the Dayton Accord negotiations began. 123
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The area where these events took place fell within the zone of responsibility of the Drina
Corps, a formation of the VRS. 124 In his role as Chief of Staff and then Commander of the Drina
Corps when the atrocities occurred, Krstic was charged with, inter alia, genocide and crimes
against humanity that included extermination, murder, persecution and deportation. 125
Prosecutors charged Krstic under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, but they did not specify a
form of direct responsibility. 126 In spite of defense arguments that joint criminal enterprise
liability was therefore not available because it had not been pled, the Trial Chamber found that
the Indictment contained sufficient references to alleged crimes committed in concert with others
to allow it. 127
Krstic was charged under both Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute and the command
responsibility provision of Article 7(3). The command responsibility theory could hold Krstic
criminally liable for crimes committed by his troops if (1) he knew or should have known about
the crimes, and (2) he did not take reasonable and necessary steps to either prevent the crimes or
punish his subordinates for their misdeeds. 128 But rather than find him vicariously liable using
command responsibility, the Trial Chamber seemed inclined to make it as clear as possible that
Krstic was directly responsible for the events at Srebrenica. 129
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participates in the commission of the crime through his subordinates, by ‘planning’, ‘instigating’
or ‘ordering’ the commission of the crime, any responsibility under Article 7(3) is subsumed
under Article 7(1).” 130
The evidence established that General Krstic, along with others, (1) played a significant
role in organizing the transportation of civilians, (2) knew it was a forcible, not voluntary,
transfer, and (3) was fully aware of the ongoing humanitarian crisis and mistreatment of civilians
by VRS soldiers. 131 The Trial Chamber concluded that the facts compelled the inference that the
political and/or military leadership of the VRS formulated a plan to permanently remove the
Bosnian Muslim population from Srebrenica and that General Krstic was a key participant. 132
Thus, the JCE actus reus requirements of plurality, a common plan, and participation were
established. 133
The Court then moved to the mens rea aspect of JCE, examining “which crimes fell
within and which fell outside the agreed object of the joint criminal enterprise to ethnically
cleanse the Srebrenica enclave.” 134 The Trial Chamber agreed that the first object of the JCE
was the forcible transfer of the Muslim civilians out of Srebrenica, and Krstic’s extensive
participation in it evidenced his intent for the crime. 135 Furthermore, the humanitarian crisis was
so closely connected to the forcible evacuation of the civilians that it fell within the object of the
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enterprise. 136 Krstic was liable because he organized the military operation on Srebrenica and
failed to take any action to alleviate the crisis by providing food, water, or security to the civilian
inhabitants of the town, creating the crisis. 137 The Trial Chamber then recognized that the
murders, rapes, beatings and abuses committed against the refugees by the VRS were not the
original objective of the joint criminal enterprise, but they were a natural and foreseeable
consequence of the ethnic cleansing campaign—thus, Krstic was liable for those crimes as well
under the Extended JCE. 138 Finally, the Court found that he knew that such crimes were related
to a widespread attack directed against the Bosnian Muslim civilian population, and his
participation undeniably established his intent to discriminate against that group. 139 Krstic was
therefore criminally responsible for the crimes against humanity of inhumane acts and
persecution. 140
The plan to ethnically cleanse Srebrenica escalated from forcibly transferring civilians to
killing all of the military-aged Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica. 141 The Trial Chamber found
that killing the men “became the object of the newly elevated joint criminal enterprise of General
Mladic and VRS Main Staff personnel” and was aimed at permanently eradicating the Bosnian
Muslim population from Srebrenica. 142 This was genocide, according to the Trial Chamber.
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Next, the Trial Chamber considered whether General Krstic was a member of the
escalated joint criminal enterprise and thus liable for genocide or complicity in genocide, as well
as other crimes constituted by the killings. 143 First, it looked at evidence showing that when
Krstic found out that thousands of Srebrenica men had been captured, he was aware no adequate
measures had been taken for their basic human needs, nor were any arrangements being made for
a prisoner-of-war exchange. 144 It concluded at that point, “General Krstic could only surmise
that the original objective of ethnic cleansing by forcible transfer had turned into a lethal plan to
destroy the male population of Srebrenica once and for all.” 145 From that point on, Drina Corps
troops took part in killing episodes, and the Court believed it was “inconceivable that all this
occurred without some degree of planning by the top officials, especially since the chain of
command was still in place.” 146 The evidence against Krstic mounted, and the Trial Chamber
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he participated in a JCE to kill the Bosnian Muslim
military-aged men from Srebrenica. 147
General Krstic may not have devised the killing plan, or participated in the
initial decision to escalate the objective of the criminal enterprise from
forcible transfer to destruction of Srebrenica’s Bosnian Muslim militaryaged male community, but there can be no doubt that, from the point he
learned of the widespread and systematic killings and became clearly
involved in their perpetration, he shared the genocidal intent to kill the
men. This cannot be gainsaid given his informed participation in the
executions through the use of Drina Corps assets. 148
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The Trial Chamber then noted that Krstic fulfilled a key-coordinating role of the killing
campaign at a stage when his participation was “clearly indispensable” in the genocidal
killings. 149 In view of both his mens rea and actus reus, he was deemed a principal perpetrator
of genocide and other connected crimes. 150
Some commentators suggested that the Tribunal’s ruling in Krstic might dilute the
Extended JCE mens rea requirement for the underlying crimes: 151
An offender may be convicted of the most serious crimes, and sentenced
to lengthy terms in prison, on the basis of what can amount to a
negligence-like standard of guilt. General Krstic was convicted of
genocide and was sentenced to a term of 46 years in prison, all on the
basis of the JCE theory of criminal liability. The Trial Chamber never
really concluded that he actually intended to commit genocide—a
requirement of the Statute—but only that genocide was a “natural and
foreseeable” consequence of a criminal plan to ethnically cleanse
Srebrenica, and that a reasonable person would have “surmised” such a
development. 152
Diluting the mens rea requirements could have far-reaching implications for the trial of
Slobodan Milosevic and beyond:
[I]f it cannot be established that the man who ruled Yugoslavia throughout
its decade of war did not actually intend to commit war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide, but only that he failed to supervise his
subordinates or joined with accomplices when a reasonable person would
have foreseen the types of atrocities they might commit . . . the door is left
ajar for future generations to deny the truth. 153
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Krstic Appeal
Krstic appealed his conviction, challenging, inter alia, that he was criminally responsible
for the crimes that arose from his individual participation in a joint criminal enterprise to forcibly
transfer civilians, and opposing the finding that he shared a genocidal intent of a joint criminal
enterprise to commit genocide against the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica. 154

On the first

challenge, the Appeals Chamber upheld the finding that the creation of a humanitarian crisis fell
within the scope of the intended joint criminal enterprise, and that Krstic participated in that
enterprise aware of the probability that other crimes might result.155 It was unnecessary to
establish that he was actually aware other criminal acts were being committed, so the appeal
against this conviction was dismissed. 156
Regarding the genocide conviction, the Appeals Chamber reviewed the evidence relied
upon by the Trial Chamber to establish intent to commit genocide and concluded the Trial
Chamber’s assertion was without a proper evidentiary basis—all it established was that “Krstic
was aware of the intent to commit genocide on the part of some members of the VRS Main Staff,
and with that knowledge, he did nothing to prevent the use of Drina Corps personnel and
resources to facilitate those killings.” 157 The Appeals Chamber emphasized that convictions for
genocide can only be entered where intent has been unequivocally established, and knowledge
alone could not support such an inference. 158
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responsibility the evidence did establish, and determined it was accurately characterized under
Article 7(1) as an aider and abettor of genocide, not as a perpetrator in a joint criminal
enterprise. 159
These findings indicate there are numerous ways prosecutors can use JCE to hold
defendants criminally liable for their crimes, but there are also important limits in place that must
be observed. The jurisprudence of the other tribunals will act as an important guideline for the
IST in its prosecution of war criminals using JCE, but the IST Statute also sets important limits
that must be maintained.

IV. ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 15(b)(4) OF THE IST STATUTE
A. Article 15(b)(4) is Taken from the Rome Statute of the ICC
The language of the IST provision on individual criminal responsibility is somewhat
different from that of the other tribunals because it takes its wording from the Rome Statute of
the ICC. 160 According to one expert, the ICC provision (and thus the IST provision, since they
are identical) “‘repairs’ the technical defaults of complicity liability, which has caused some
misunderstanding and resulted in creative law-making at the ad hoc Tribunals.” 161 Therefore,
the statutory provisions warrant closer examination in order to determine how the IST may
interpret the JCE doctrine under a statute that contains striking differences to those of the other
courts.
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B. Textual Differences to the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL Statutes
A comparison of the tribunal statutes quickly reveals two important distinctions. First,
Article 15(b)(4) contains specific language regarding common purpose,162 unlike the other three
tribunals’ statutes where the judges have interpreted that common purpose (joint criminal
enterprise) is implied by the statute. Second, the IST Statute explicitly defines the requisite
mental state for crimes committed by persons acting with a common purpose, whereas the Tadic
Appeals Chamber had to define the doctrine’s evidentiary requirements, which subsequent
rulings have upheld.
1. How Statutory Authorization Impacts the Use of JCE at the IST
The wording of the IST Statute expressly authorizes prosecutors to charge defendants
before the Tribunal with common purpose liability, so the IST will not have to endure the
criticism that the other tribunals faced about whether it is fair to use judge-made doctrine to hold
defendants criminally liable.

Express statutory authorization to employ common purpose

liability promotes the legitimacy of its use in IST proceedings.
Furthermore, because the Tadic Appeals Chamber was not authorized by statute to apply
JCE as a form of criminal responsibility, it had to justify the theory by finding that it existed as
customary international law in 1992 at the time of the alleged acts. More than ten years have
passed since the Tadic Appeals Chamber holding, and an extensive body of subsequent case law
now supports the notion that joint criminal enterprise is part of customary international law from
1992 onward. But the defendants appearing before the IST committed crimes pre-dating 1992.
Prosecutors before the IST may therefore have to demonstrate that JCE liability was customary
international law in the 1980s when Al-Dujayl and Operation Anfal took place, but the Statute’s
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specific authorization of the theory may preempt such a showing. In the event that it does not,
the Tadic Appeals Chamber’s analysis of post-World War II cases and the practices of various
national systems provide a good starting point for this assertion. 163
2. How the IST Statute’s Wording Affects the Evidentiary Requirements of JCE
Article 15(b)(4) sets the lowest possible standard of actus reus to hold perpetrators in a
common plan criminally responsible, penalizing ‘any other way’ one contributes to the
commission of a crime by a group acting with a common purpose. 164 The focus of this form of
liability really lies with the mens rea provision. The IST Statute contains a twofold mental
standard—the first relates to the participant’s contribution and the other relates to the subsequent
crime. First, subparagraph (i) holds that the participant must have the specific intention to
promote the practical acts and ideological objectives of the group, or a shared intent with the
group. 165 Thus, Basic JCE cases can be brought under this provision. The Systemic JCE cases
might also fall under this provision if the participants were clearly “furthering the criminal
activity or criminal purpose of the group,” so cases involving individuals in superior positions at
the camp could most likely be pursued with this approach. 166
Subparagraph (ii) of Article 15(b)(4) has a major impact on Extended JCEs because the
provision eliminates the reckless mental state used with defendants in cases where the accused
participated in the enterprise in spite of the risk that additional crimes outside the original scope
of the enterprise were foreseeable. The IST provision requires the accused to have knowledge of
163
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the intention of the group to commit the (additional) crime. This higher mental state requirement
seems to preclude the IST from prosecuting Extended JCE cases since the accused in such
situations does not know of the intention of the group member who commits the additional crime,
even if it might be foreseeable. 167 This is a startling consequence, especially since the Extended
JCE seems to be the most effective form of criminal liability for prosecuting key leaders on an
international level.
C. How to Overcome Preclusion of the Extended JCE
Even though the Extended JCE seems to be statutorily precluded by the wording of
Article 15(b)(4), there may still be a way the IST could find key leaders individually responsible
for crimes committed outside the scope of the original enterprise.
1. Strategy One: Follow the Other Tribunals’ Jurisprudence, Which Allows Extended JCE
One expert suggests that preclusion of the Extended JCE is easily overcome because the
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals reflects general legal principles and customary international
law, so it is available for the IST to draw from and apply. 168 Such a strategy serves several
important interests. First, it enables the IST to hold masterminds of heinous atrocities criminally
liable for acts carried out in circumstances from which they were far removed. Second, by
incorporating the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals as much as possible, the IST prevents the
development of two diverging bodies of international criminal law. 169 Maintaining consistency
between the Tribunals builds a coherent and uniform international criminal law precedent for the
future. Finally, following the established jurisprudence of the other tribunals would signal to the
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international community that the IST has an interest in upholding established principles of
international law and legitimizing its proceedings in the court of international opinion.
At the same time, this strategy has one glaring drawback. Even more important than
courting public opinion abroad, it is crucial for the Iraqi people to perceive the IST proceedings
as fair and to respect the outcome. By turning to a judge-made doctrine with a lower mental
state than is required by the IST Statute, the Iraqi people may see the defendants as scapegoats or
martyrs because the prosecutors have gone outside the bounds of the statute they are obligated to
follow. “Deviation from adherence to strict principles may augment the chances of conviction
but it can also threaten the Tribunal’s ability to fulfill its solemn goals.” 170
2. Strategy Two: Expand the Common Purpose Doctrine to Include Conspiracy
Another possible way to overcome preclusion of the Extended JCE is to interpret that the
IST Statute’s “common purpose” wording includes conspiracy as another form of individual
criminal responsibility. Conspiracy is well suited for prosecuting the criminal masterminds
behind modern war crimes. These key players often initiate the agreements to commit the crime,
and their charisma, intelligence, and power fuel the conspiratorial process. 171 Yet they are also
most often capable of eluding conviction, either because of their status and power, or because
they have skillfully distanced themselves from actual acts of substantive crime. 172 Furthermore,
they may be able to avoid individual responsibility under joint criminal enterprise theories
because the prosecution is unable to connect their conduct or state of mind with a particular
crime. 173 In comparison, the evidentiary requirements of conspiracy may be less restrictive.
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If the IST does adopt conspiracy as another form of individual criminal responsibility, it
would be wise to apply the charge only to the most culpable individuals who have distanced
themselves from the actual commission of crimes but without whom there would be no impetus
to commit them. By restricting the use of conspiracy, the IST could establish individual criminal
responsibility of the most blameworthy while exonerating the masses from community guilt,
curtailing much of the criticism that was aimed at the Nuremberg Tribunal when the conspiracy
charge was used in the Nazi war criminal trials.
The arguments both for and against the adoption of conspiracy are set forth below, but a
strong legal argument can be made that would justify such an adoption.
a. The Role of Conspiracy at Nuremberg
The law of conspiracy is based in common law, and Allies from countries with civil law
traditions considered the concept to be “broad, vague and unfamiliar” when forming the
Nuremberg Tribunal, but the crime was included in Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter
nonetheless. 174 The charge was “central” in convicting the major World War II criminals, but
unfortunately, it was not defined, and there was substantial room for argument and interpretation
as to its meaning. 175 The malleability of the charge was also criticized because it allowed
prosecutors to pursue especially aggressive strategies against defendants. 176
A lawyer at the U.S. War Department first proposed the strategy for conspiracy that
ultimately prevailed at Nuremberg. 177 Under his plan, the Allies would formally indict the major
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Nazi organizations such as the SS and the Gestapo, and the Tribunal would try the criminality of
the organizations themselves. 178

Once an organization was declared a criminal group, an

individual brought before the court could be prosecuted for the crime of membership, and
individual responsibility would be put under the heading of criminal participation. 179

This

strategy extended liability from the few men at the head of the Nazi regime to two million
collaborators at all levels of the hierarchy who knew of the criminal acts of their fellow members
and party leaders and acquiesced in them. 180
The judges trying the Nazi organizations were uncomfortable with such a concept.
Ultimately, they acquitted four of the seven indicted organizations and shifted the burden of
proof to the prosecution, which had to show that the defendant voluntarily joined the
organization and (1) knew it was engaged in crimes within the London Charter’s jurisdiction, or
(2) personally participated in such crimes. 181 This decision “effectively negated the procedural
benefits to the prosecution” that could have flowed from the conviction of criminal
organizations 182 to hold lower-level individuals criminally responsible. The vision of thousands
of trials and mass convictions for membership in criminal organizations never materialized. 183
Conspiracy was not defined in the Nuremberg Charter, 184 but it was used both as a
substantive crime and as a theory of liability at Nuremberg. 185 The Nuremberg Judgement

178

Id.

179

VAN SLIEDREGT,

180

Id., at 21; see also Danner & Martinez, supra note 19, at 113.

181

Danner & Martinez, supra note 19, at 114.

182

Id.

183

Id.

184

MARRUS, supra note 3, at 232.

supra note 67, at 22-27.

45

endorsed a restrictive notion of conspiracy, rejecting its application to crimes against humanity
and war crimes but allowing conspiracy convictions for members of Hitler’s senior leadership
who actively participated in the planning to commit aggressive war. 186 The Nuremberg Tribunal
said this narrowed use and the additional requirements of proof placed on the prosecution were
“in accordance with well-settled legal principles, one of the most important of which is that
criminal guilt is personal, and that mass punishment should be avoided.”187
b. The Role of Conspiracy in International Law Today
Critics might argue that conspiracy is in no way widespread or accepted enough to be
considered part of customary international law and thus can not be impliedly read into the IST
Statute. 188 Nonetheless, a strong argument can be made that when conspiracy is used in a
limited fashion for very specific international crimes, such as proposed for the IST, the
international community has embraced it.
As discussed supra, the Nuremberg precedent has formed much of the basis of
contemporary international law, especially as it pertains to the international Tribunals. Since
conspiracy was introduced into international jurisprudence at Nuremberg, it has made its way
into conventions and treaties dealing with international criminal law matters. Perhaps the most
relevant example of widespread acceptance in international criminal law is its use in connection
with genocide. “Conspiracy to commit genocide” is a punishable act in the Statutes of the ICTY,
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the ICTR, and the IST. 189 It is also a crime according to the Genocide Convention, which has
136 parties and 41 signatories. 190 Conspiracy is also proscribed in numerous other conventions
and treaties for drug trafficking, 191 money laundering, 192 slavery 193 and apartheid. 194
Many national legal systems also recognize conspiracy, including, most importantly, Iraq.
Section 5(2) of Iraq’s Criminal Penal Code states, “Any person who attempts to set up a criminal
conspiracy or who plays a major part in it is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding
10 years if that offense is a felony.” 195 Many Iraqi laws have been incorporated into the IST
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Statute, so to interpret that the recognized crime of conspiracy is encompassed by the “common
purpose” wording of Article 15(b)(4) is reasonable.
c. Precedent to Expand Common Purpose Liability Set by Tadic Appeals Chamber
The precedent that a common purpose doctrine such as conspiracy could be implied by
statute has already been set by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic. As explained previously,
the Appeals Chamber concluded that joint criminal enterprise was an implied form of direct
responsibility under the ICTY Statute, then it defined the evidentiary requirements of JCE so as
to limit its use. The IST could choose to follow this example and interpret that conspiracy is
implied by the “common purpose” wording of the IST Statute. If it does read that conspiracy is
implied in the IST Statute, it is crucial for the Tribunal to restrict and clearly spell out the
evidentiary requirements and boundaries of the doctrine, just as the Tadic Appeals Chamber did
for JCE and the Nuremberg Tribunal attempted to do with conspiracy. 196
d. The Presence of Conspiracy in the Iraqi Penal Code Helps Overcome
Legality Principle Issues
In the context of international criminal law, the concept of nullum crimen sine lege, nulla
poena sine lege has a “special dimension” because international law is not codified in one
uniform source, and what is customary may be open to interpretation. 197 However, a strong
argument can be made that the IST may adopt conspiracy liability because conspiracy is part of
customary international law when it is restrictively applied to serious international crimes such
as those before the IST, and the national nature of the Iraqi Special Tribunal lends additional
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strength to the proposal. Conspiracy has been part of Iraq’s national fabric since at least 1969, so
it is reasonable to charge Iraqi nationals or residents198 before the IST because they are subject to
Iraqi laws, including the 1969 penal code. Based on these authorities and the example set by the
Tadic Appeals Chamber, the IST could choose to adopt conspiracy as part of common purpose
liability. Thus, defendants appearing before the IST for their alleged involvement in Al-Dujayl
and Operation Anfal in the 1980s could be found individually liable for conspiracy to commit
crimes under the IST’s jurisdiction.
e. The IST Must Distinguish Conspiracy from JCE if it Expands Common Purpose
Liability
Despite the close similarities between JCE and conspiracy, they are distinct. 199 Both
require an agreement among individuals to commit a crime, but JCE is exclusively used as a
theory of liability while conspiracy may act both as a substantive crime and as a theory of
liability. 200 One international judge has asserted that conspiracy does not constitute a liability
theory in its own right, 201 but the Nuremberg precedent counters such criticism. Thus, the IST
could choose to adopt conspiracy both as a theory of liability and as a standalone crime.
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The evidentiary requirements of conspiracy may be less problematic for prosecutors to
reach in terms of proof than JCE. The actus reus that prosecutors must prove is the agreement,
which “is not a mere mental operation, but must involve spoken or written words or other overt
acts.” 202 In other words, the agreement must be manifested by acts of some kind. To meet the
mens rea requirement of conspiracy, prosecutors must show the defendant had the intent to carry
out the agreement, to cause the forbidden result. 203 Whether the defendant could foresee or
know that additional crimes would result is irrelevant because what is important under
conspiracy is the original agreement and intent to commit a crime, not participation in carrying
out the crime or what crime is actually committed. 204 Thus, even if the scope of the original
enterprise is exceeded, the participants in the enterprise can still be held criminally responsible
for agreeing and intending to commit a crime that falls under the IST’s jurisdiction.

V. APPLICATION OF FACTS TO ARTICLE 15(b)(4)
Strategic prosecution of individuals most responsible for events at Al-Dujayl and in
connection with Operation Anfal may need to take a different tactic in light of the differences
between the IST Statute and that of the other tribunals. As stated previously, the IST may
choose to follow the jurisprudence of the other tribunals, or it may choose to adopt conspiracy as
a form of liability implied by the common purpose language of the IST Statute. Therefore, this
memorandum will apply the basic facts of Al-Dujayl and Operation Anfal using both JCE and
conspiracy in order to illustrate how defendants before the IST may be held responsible for
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crimes associated with these events in light of the limitations of the doctrines and their respective
evidentiary requirements.
A. Al-Dujayl
The initial gunfight leaving approximately 150 people dead could arguably be deemed
self-defense by Saddam Hussein and the other members of his convoy since the villagers
attacked the motorcade and took them by surprise. The events that took place after that are
another matter, however.
First, liability for Hussein’s order to conduct reprisals against the inhabitants of the town
and to destroy the orchards seems to fall under Article 15(b)(2) of the Statute, which provides
direct responsibility for issuing such orders. But Hussein and the other defendants might also be
successfully prosecuted under the 15(b)(4) provision using either JCE or conspiracy.
1. Basic JCE Analysis
The actus reus requirements of a JCE are satisfied. First, a plurality of persons existed,
which was clearly exhibited by the massive scale of the reprisals conducted against the villagers
of Al-Dujayl. Second, they had a common plan to commit crimes listed in the Tribunal Statute,
which was evidenced by the way they acted in unison to demolish thousands of acres of natural
resources, organize deportations, summarily kill hundreds of villagers and detain hundreds more,
and so on. Finally, as long as prosecutors have evidence to show Hussein and the other
defendants acted “in any way” to contribute to the commission of such crimes, the third prong is
easily met.
The mens rea analysis also supports prosecution using JCE liability. The facts of the
events might fit the Basic JCE category since all of the co-perpetrators shared the intent to
conduct reprisals using a variety of different crimes to accomplish this enterprise.
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While

“reprisals” are not a crime under the terms of the IST Statute, prosecutors could argue this was
an umbrella term encompassing all of the crimes that were committed that are listed in the
Statute, including crimes against humanity (deportation or forcible transfer of civilians, murder,
imprisonment), as well as the wastage of national resources and other violations of Iraqi law.
2. Extended JCE Analysis Following the Jurisprudence of the Other Tribunals
It could be argued that the Extended JCE is more fitting for the events of Al-Dujayl since
the range and extent of the crimes might be considered outside the scope of the group’s original
purpose, although using reprisals as an umbrella term for the host of crimes committed seems to
stem that criticism. Nevertheless, classifying the events at Al-Dujayl in the Extended JCE
category would have several implications, so a two-fold analysis is required. First, the IST
would have to be willing to follow the jurisprudence of the other tribunals in spite of apparent
statutory preclusion of the Extended JCE.

If this occurs, the prosecution must show the

defendants (1) had an intent to participate in the original criminal purpose of the group, and (2)
additional crimes were foreseeable, yet the accused willingly continued to participate in spite of
that risk. Here, it was foreseeable that a whole range of crimes would arise as part of a campaign
of reprisals against the villagers, yet the participants took that risk and participated in spite of it.
3. Conspiracy Analysis
If the IST interprets that its Statute precludes the use of the Extended JCE, but it allows
for conspiracy under the common purpose wording of the statute, the basic facts of Al-Dujayl
indicate that defendants who allegedly committed crimes there could successfully be prosecuted
under conspiracy liability. First, the actus reus of an agreement is manifested in the orders of
Saddam Hussein to conduct reprisals and cut down the date trees, and by the subsequent actions
of those who used a variety of criminal means to do so, punishing the villagers for their actions
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against the motorcade. The mens rea of intent to carry out the purpose of the group, or reprisals,
is also evidenced by these actions—the very nature of which must be intentionally carried out
and could not be construed as accidental.
B. Operation Anfal
A similar analysis is appropriate for Operation Anfal, which occurred in 1988 and
contains many similarities to the Krstic case.
1. Basic JCE Analysis
Based on the facts provided, the actus reus requirements for a JCE in any category are
satisfied: (1) a plurality of persons existed (2) who had a common plan to commit crimes that
fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and (3) the individuals involved executed that plan. As
previously mentioned, the level of participation required under the IST Statute is easily met with
virtually any level of contribution.
The mens rea analysis also supports prosecution of defendants before the IST using JCE
liability. It might be possible to classify the enterprise as a Basic JCE if the original purpose of
the group was to commit crimes against the Kurds. Prosecutors might be able to stay within the
confines of the IST Statute by showing that the magnitude of the operations, the coordination
required, the types of crimes committed, and the massive scale of destruction all indicate intent
at the highest level of the regime or at the very least, knowledge that such crimes and even
additional crimes were occurring. But if the original purpose of the enterprise was to commit
specific crimes under the guise of military necessity and then the enterprise escalated to another
level, the Extended JCE classification may be more appropriate.
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2. Extended JCE Analysis
The Krstic case contains many factual similarities to the events of Operation Anfal. For
example, the government labeled its activities as military operations and used the army to carry
out crimes. The facts may indicate that what began as an intent to commit specific crimes under
the guise of “military operations” escalated to another level. If that is the case, prosecutors must
show that the additional crimes were foreseeable and participants willingly participated in spite
of the risk that other crimes might be committed. However, as previously indicated, successful
prosecution under these circumstances may only occur if the IST follows the basic principles of
jurisprudence from the other Tribunals and the Extended JCE is permitted.
3. Conspiracy Analysis
If the IST interprets that its Statute precludes the use of the Extended JCE and the events
do not fit appropriately under the Basic JCE, prosecutors may still be prosecuted under
conspiracy liability if the IST permits. The actus reus of an agreement is manifested in the sheer
level of coordination required to subject 100,000 Kurds to mass executions, chemical attacks,
and deportations, as well as to destroy 2,000 villages. The mens rea of intent to carry out the
crimes is also evidenced by these actions—again, the magnitude, volume, and type of crimes
committed precludes the finding that they were anything but intentional.

VI. CONCLUSION
The IST must decide whether it will follow the Extended JCE jurisprudence of the other
tribunals that may not be in compliance with the mens rea requirements of its Statute, or whether
to adopt a new form of common purpose liability in the same fashion that the ICTY Appeals
Chamber did in Tadic. There are strong arguments on both sides, but the IST must also keep the
underlying goals of the Tribunal in perspective in order to ensure that the proceedings are viewed
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as legitimate and fair. The people who have been victimized by atrocities deserve to see that
justice is sought so that they can build their futures, not seek vengeance for the past. 205 Common
purpose liability allows prosecutors to seek such justice. How the IST chooses to fashion it
remains to be seen.

205

James C. O’Brien, The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former
Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 639, 659 (Oct. 1993). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 51.]
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